Autonomous Algorithmic Collusion: Economic Research and Policy Implications
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 37(3), 459-478.
Abstract
This article reviews economic research on autonomous algorithmic collusion and discusses its implications for competition policy. It connects theoretical, experimental, and empirical evidence to the institutional questions facing competition authorities.
Main Finding
The economic evidence points to specific mechanisms through which autonomous algorithms can soften competition, but the strength of those mechanisms depends on market and algorithm design.
Policy Relevance
Competition authorities need evidence on when algorithmic systems change competitive conduct, not only general claims about algorithmic collusion.
See Also
- [Policy]Pricing Algorithms as Third-Party Facilitators of Collusion
- [Paper]Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market
- [Policy]Algorithmic Pricing and Competition
- [Paper]Interaction of Spectrum Auctions and Mobile Market Competition: Review of Theory and Evidence from European 4G Auctions
- [Paper]Outsourcing Algorithm Development: Evidence from Contractors and LLMs
- [Paper]Frontiers: How Much Influencer Marketing Is Undisclosed? Evidence from Twitter
- [Paper]The Effects of Advertising Disclosure Regulations on Social Media: Evidence from Instagram
- [Paper]Sharing News Left and Right: Frictions and Misinformation on Twitter